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14 NOV 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Dr. Brzezinski,
13 November 1978

1. Brzezinski would like a memorandum from us assessing what the PRC attitude would be towards an improvement in US/Vietnamese relations, or in a recognition of Vietnam by the United States.

2. Brzezinski would like to get things moving as rapidly as possible on the establishment of standards for counterintelligence and foreign intelligence clandestine collection reviews by the SCC. He asked that I call Griffin Bell and get this moving, and that we try to get a look at what Bell is going to develop as a result of the last SCC meeting on this. In the meantime, I would like Tony Lapham to expedite our actions on this problem so we can make a good case with Bell.



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a. The last several names didn't appear to have very broad experience.

b. None of the political advisors we had selected were familiar with [redacted]

c. He therefore felt that a team effort which mixed experts on [redacted] with experts with political acumen might be good. We agreed that we would try to get [redacted]

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and one of the Ambassador's two academicians to add to
[redacted] whom the NSC has
signed up and who is on his way to [redacted] now. Brzezinski's
idea would be to have the three of these people work here
in Washington initially as a group to try to see what ideas
they can come up with. We could then talk about whether any
or all of them should go to [redacted] will be back
from [redacted] this week, so we can go ahead with this possibly
next week. The ball is in our court to move out.

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5. I told Brzezinski he was welcome to talk with [redacted] if he
wanted to, though I recommended not in the White House. He was nervous
about being "used" if he went to any great length to meet with him.

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8. I signed, dated and delivered the memo on leaks and the Attorney
General.

9. I didn't get to any of the other items.


10. We discussed the morning's SCC on MIG-23s in Cuba. Brzezinski
asked me how I thought it came out. I said I thought it was satisfactory.
Now that we had determined that the definition of offensive was ground
attack capability, clearly any ground attack capability implied the
potential for nuclear attack but we were not defining offensive as having
a nuclear attack capability in place, only a ground attack capability with
its implicit potential for ground nuclear attack. I did say on the policy
side I felt we would be making a mistake if we drew a firm line with the

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Soviets between one and two MIG-23D/Fs which would be acceptable to us
and three or four that would not.



At
STANSFIELD TURNER
Director

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
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Side A, 0 - 1 1/4

Executive Assistant _____

Military Assistant _____

Writer



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Executive Secretary _____

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Es. -

I PASSED PARA 1 IN DRAFTS
TO NPAC.

JAY PASSED PARA 4 TO



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